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AFTER INTERACTION 
It is, arguably, where it all began for interaction. Doug Engelbart’s latterly titled “The Mother of all 
Demos” spectacularly set the scene for what we do in HCI and especially what we imagine 
interaction to be. Engelbart and his team showcased a remarkable collection of technologies for 
seeing and manipulating data. The demo is best known for the introduction of the mouse as an input 
device, but also presented was an integrated teleconferencing system and the simultaneous 
collaborative editing of a text document. Think computing in the late 1960s, but with the mouse, 
and something akin to Skype and Google Docs. It’s hard to imagine how extraordinary this must 
have seemed at a time when telephone adoption was only just reaching a plateau in the US and, for 
all but the technological elite, the idea of networked computers was the stuff of science fiction or, 
more likely, just unthought-of. 
 
Taking nothing away for the remarkable technological achievements, Engelbart’s film stands, of 
course, as a piece of theatre. Through a series of clicks and drags, complex computational tasks are 
achieved which the then audience were well aware would ordinarily have taken numerous 
keystrokes if not lines of code to execute. The magic of the demo is precisely that it seems to be the 
interaction that is, well, magical. The remote collaborations, especially, but also the use of the 
mouse for controlling various inputs, locates the action between human and machine. The careful 
choreography prefigures an interface, foregrounding a very particular set of relations between user 
and computer. Engelbart’s demo literally performs the interface and interaction.  
 
This interaction has then become a cornerstone for HCI and interaction design (ID). It is quite 
simply taken for granted in what we do. Indeed, as even the not so attentive readers will have 
noticed, in its plural, it is the name given to this publication. There is much more to this, though, 
than a simple matter of names. Interaction does some conceptual work. It points to an idea that the 
applied and research work we do is concentrated at the human-machine interface. Yes, we can and 
have stretched this to include the possibilities of many humans and/or many machines, but 
nevertheless our business has been all about human-machine interactions, and in some cases 
manifold interactions. 
 
Here, I want to argue that as a concept interaction hinges on an outmoded notion of technology in 
use. I’ll argue that technology use is, in fact, already and has always been about a lot more than 
human-machine interactions (at least in how interaction is regularly imagined in HCI and ID). I 
want to suggest that what we have been doing by both investigating and designing technology is 
participating in and to some extent configuring dense, interconnected relationships of humans and 
non-humans. That is, we have been assembling and reassembling human-machine hybrids, often in 
great numbers. And, rather than working at a neatly defined interface, we have knitted together and 
entangled ourselves in these interwoven networks of relations, and go on doing so.  
 
There may be no controversy here, but what I want to add is that, under the rubric of HCI and ID, 
we have been giving form to networks that mobilise and entangle not just people and machines, but 
also produce what we might think of as worlds—social, technical, scientific, intellectual, 
organisational, political, ethical worlds (to name just the obvious). Each and every time we have 
observed or setup an interaction between humans and machines, and brought into being particular 
relational networks, we have also given shape to distinctive regimes of knowing and being in the 
world. We have been invested in—to borrow a phrase from the philosopher Nelson Goodman 
(1978)—“world making”.  
 
To make this more concrete, let us return to Engelbart’s demo. As I’ve said, the demo creates the 
illusion that it’s the communication from humans to machines (and back again)—the human-
computer interaction—where the action is. However, much is also being done beyond this narrow 
stage, behind (and to the sides of) the scenes. Take the most obvious. The machines here have been 
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configured just so to perform this demo. What we don’t see are the connecting cables, the binding 
code, the collective organisation, the infrastructures necessary to make things work (Suchman, 
2006). Hidden is an entangled network of things and people that precipitates particular kinds of 
relationships and prioritises particular ways of understanding the world.  
 
The relations go much deeper than any discrete interactions between user and machine. It’s 
startling, for example, to see how Englebart behaves very much like a machine. Admittedly this 
may be more an indication of the era in which the film was made, but still we see that a very 
particular rhythm is composed for this performance that feels peculiarly inhuman. The interface and 
the curated interactions necessitate a ‘body-work’ that entwines user and machine, configuring how 
one is in and thus reasons about the world (Myers, 2008). To imagine the human and machine as 
separate, mediated only by discrete interactions, belies how tightly interwoven things are here.  
 
So it is not merely the interface that has been designed; the assemblies of humans, machines and 
interactions are all being (con)figured in some way. An “imaginative landscape” is conjured up with 
its own “extended network of human labors and affiliated technologies” (Suchman, 2006, p. 246), 
and its particular elisions or “modes of erasure” (ibid., p. 238). This then is world making. The 
technologies presented in Englebart’s demo aren’t incidental to a world (or worlds) in the making, 
they are integral to it/them. A network of humans and nonhumans are co-constituting ways of 
seeing, knowing and doing in very special ways, they bind and entangle to perform worlds. 
 
I want to argue, then, that interaction as a concept presents a troubling framing of what we do. It is 
not just its narrowness. I believe it to be pernicious in that it diminishes our responsibilities and 
frankly misses the proverbial trick when it comes to making better things and, ultimately, making 
things and worlds better. In the following my hope is to propose a counter framing, one that 
tentatively sets the stage for a different encounter with the relations between humans and 
computers. This will be a framing that embraces the relations that are brought into being when we 
design things, and strives—albeit with hesitance and care—towards a thriving and flourishing of 
these relations in the worlds we bring into being.  
 
To begin sketching out this line of argument, an important point to make is that the decision to 
concentrate our attentions on the interface (at the cost of seeing the wider relations) has its roots in a 
very particular metaphysics. Here, I am talking about a materialism where nonhuman matter is 
passive, non-vital—it is measurable, rule-governed and subject to universals, and crucially (because 
of its passivity) it is understood to be in the service of humans (Olikowski, 2007). In this light, it’s 
understandable that we might conjure up a notion of interaction where, on the one side humans and 
on the other nonhumans (or computers) are neatly separated. Interaction design from this point of 
view is unproblematically the job of improving efficiency, productivity or the experience by (re-
)designing the interface. Also, it is, as we say, human-centred, meaning we take the ‘exceptional’ 
qualities of being human—thought, cognition, physiology, etc.—to be what guides the design of 
interactions with things. And yet, even with just a modicum of care, it’s difficult not to see holes in 
this thinking.  
 
First, there is the nagging question of how exactly we decide where the line is drawn between 
humans and nonhumans/computers? Already, HCI has a broad body of work that problematises the 
interface and the interactions seemingly located between human and computer. Norman (1988) 
blurred the boundary, shifting some of what was thought to be human potential into things. He 
wrote of things affording particular actions, famously detailing the ‘instructions-for-use’ embedded 
in such mundane objects as door and mug handles. Work coming from the same scholarly tradition 
has demonstrated that cognitive capacities can extend beyond the individual’s mind and into the 
interactions between people. Thus models of interaction might be something shared, not just in the 
head, but in the world. Bødker (1991) and Suchman (2006) have recognised the fluidity and 
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instability of the interface. Bødker showed interfaces to be multiple as we tackle practical problems 
using computers, and, by calling attention to the emergent qualities of plans and actions, Suchman 
showed how our interactions with machines are highly contingent.  
 
To a greater or lesser extent (and with it must be said quite different epistemic grounds) what these 
perspectives also invite are questions around agency. They begin to question not only the idea that 
agency is solely in the hands of human users, but also how they might be distributed, albeit 
unevenly, across relational assemblages of humans and nonhumans. In other words, they invite 
questions about where exactly we understand the interface and interactions to be, how discrete they 
really are, and whether there really is an intrinsic separation to be bridged between human and 
machine. So, building on the thinking from scholars like those above and many further afield, it 
seems fair to ask whether we have reached a stage where interaction raises more questions than 
answers? Whether, when carefully scrutinised, it starts to unravel and loose purchase as a useful 
concept?  
 
I want to propose, then, a move beyond interaction. My first interjection is to contest the kind of 
materialism that treats human and nonhuman things as fundamentally separate—that imagines that 
there is in some way an intrinsic or essential difference between the two. With a now well-
established mode of thinking in the social sciences and humanities underlying my argument, my 
proposal here is simply to invite hesitation when it comes to working at the intersections between 
humans and nonhumans. Might we ask why the divisions must be cut in this way? Is agency so 
neatly divided? What might happen if we imagined other kinds of separation? And, what might 
happen if we began to see these separations as enacted, not essential but performed in very much 
the same way as Englebart’s ‘mother of all demos’?  
 
Taking this invitation to hesitation seriously, we might begin to imagine a new materialism or 
sociomaterialism (Orlinkowski, 2007) where things as well as humans are enlivened and where it 
isn’t any sort of ‘natural’ division between humans and nonhumans that dominates our thinking, but 
a much richer notion of relations always already underway, and always performing some figuring—
some kinds of worlds. The design challenge here shifts away from working within a stable and 
tightly demarcated interface to making sense of a wider set of fluid relations, ones that we ourselves 
are inexorably entangled in and thus must be accountable for. The emphasis broadens to be about 
what worlds we are making, and indeed, the kinds of worlds we want to make.  
 
Take something close to my own research interests, London’s public rental bike scheme. In terms of 
interaction, the challenge would seem to be one of providing the public with quick and easy ways to 
rent bicycles. With a network of 700 docking stations across the city and 10,000 bikes moving 
between them, complexity becomes an especially important factor to monitor and handle in 
designing efficient technologies and services. Interaction concentrates the action between human 
and non-human actors and design is then a remedial business of improving, servicing or sometimes 
enriching the user’s interactions with the scheme’s systems. But this fails to account for relations 
with the wider organisation of the city and civic/social life. Undeniably apparent is that the 
technologies are implicated in a panoply of infrastructural, economic, and political concerns, and 
yet, seen through a lens of interaction, the relational threads binding these strewn-together worlds 
are somehow lost. As if by magic, interaction collapses into a narrow problem to be ‘solved’. 
 
In contrast, we find a relational framing gives us a sense that something rather different is at stake 
in the technological and infrastructural capacities we might design for. As with other sprawling and 
densely populated cities in the global North, contemporary London is being subject to a project of 
regeneration and gentrification. Programmes supported often through public-private partnerships 
have been undertaken to redevelop neighbourhoods seen to be economically deprived in central and 
greater London. Yet, while there have been visible improvements to these areas, the programmes 
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have not been without controversy. Commentators write of a ‘cleansing’ of neighbourhoods as the 
regeneration has driven up prices and driven out financially less stable cross-sections of the 
populace. In other words, a diversity that has arguably been the hallmark of London, and been the 
route of much of its success as a cosmopolitan city, is being eroded. Whilst great towers are being 
built, peculiarly singular ideas of regeneration are exerting a flattening force on the city. London is 
being smoothed over, subject to a force where qualities of difference are being moved over for an 
aesthetic of sameness. 
 
The bike rental scheme—its own instance of a public-private partnership—cannot be properly 
understood outside this worldly regime. Its technologies of interaction are inexorably bound up with 
the flows and trajectories of urban and civic life in London. As an example, through the scheme’s 
mechanisms for payment and bike logging, journey times on the rental bikes turn out to be highly 
constrained with over 95% of all journeys falling under a free 30-minute threshold. Set alongside 
the divisive decisions on where to locate the bike’s docking stations, the scheme’s own data paints a 
picture of a patchworked city with hubs in the financial districts and dense spokes funnelled to the 
residential neighbourhoods that service them. Large areas to the East and South East are rendered 
invisible in these cycle-data routes. The physical and computational infrastructures are then knitting 
new layers of physical movement and computation into an historic infrastructure that shapes and 
undergirds London; they are etching different geographies of human-machine circulations into and 
across the urban topography, and giving shape to distinct rhythms coursing through the city. In this 
instance, they also bring into being a network of nodes and connections across London that perhaps 
unsurprisingly correspond to where wealth and prosperity are accumulating.  
 
Figure 1.  “Connected clusters” of bike docking stations by James Siddle. 
With such an intermingling of people, things, agencies, infrastructures, etc., it feels peculiar—
misleading even—to cement and narrow in on human-machine interactions and to centre agency 
with the human. These networks of transport (and the technologies and infrastructures that are part 
of them) present so much more than neatly demarcated interactional problems between human and 
computer. They invite a deeper understanding of the unfolding relations between humans and 
things, and their capacities for enabling particular forms of social and civic life. With a great deal of 
hesitance and care, we might wonder how the machines and infrastructures could play into a 
different kind of atmosphere in the city, one that affords a multiplicity of worlds—of logics, beliefs, 
values, etc. We might imagine, for example how the bike scheme could be designed to enliven the 
connections throughout the city, not by funnelling or flattening them, but by allowing the relations 
between people, geography, infrastructures and technologies to intensify and flourish. What this 
means for the design of specific technologies I leave open. My point here is that we see the 
possibility to frame our relations with technology very differently and, in doing so, we might begin 
to see the scope of our work open up to a much richer set of possibilities.  
 
In closing, then, I want to ask in more general terms what it could be to work with these much 
wider and denser networks of relations. Interaction presents our work as deceptively simple and 
narrow. It conjures up an idea of a neatly demarcated intersection that we might work on, an 
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interaction that we can stand outside of and unproblematically design and optimise. Paying closer 
attention, though, we see very quickly that we have always been entangled in worlds in the making, 
worlds where we differentiate, prioritise and ultimately exert particular kinds of value. 
 
And so, after interaction, with hesitance and care, might we ask how we want to understand and 
design technologies in these worlds? Resisting the forces that narrow or flatten worldly capacities, 
and seeing agency as emerging in the manifold relations, can we think of an orientation to design 
that seeks to thicken the relations, that is about how the multiple worlds—in their combination and 
through a dependence on each other—thrive. This I take to be a more responsive and responsible 
framing of design, and I would argue one that is far more open to the possibilities of something 
different and, perhaps, better.  
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